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Forthcoming in Punishment and Society 
 
Crime, Punishment and Segregation in the United States: The Paradox of Local Democracy 
Nicola Lacey and David Soskice 
Introduction 
 
A copious literature has analysed the increase in levels of both crime and punishment in developed 
countries over the last 40 years. A comparative strand in this literature has thrown light on the 
differences between countries both in patterns of offending and, particularly, in patterns of 
punishment relative to trends in crime, and has ventured some explanations. Drawing on the 
analysis of Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001), it has been suggested that the 
institutional capacity both to temper crime and to retain stable penal policy and moderation in 
punishment is greater in the co-ordinated political economies of northern Europe and the Nordic 
region, while the costs of exclusionary punishments are, at least for insiders, greater in these 
economies (Lacey 2008). Conversely, the more flexible,  and significantly more unequal liberal 
market economies,  lack the institutional mechanisms of coordination  which foster capacity to 
broker cross-institutional agreements to stabilise penal policy in coordinated market economies.  
Moreover the lower investment made by liberal market economies in education and training implies 
that  the cost of exclusionary and stigmatising punishment of those surplus to labour market 
requirements is lower than in coordinated market economies. 
Among the higher-crime, more punitive liberal market economies which share similar economic and 
welfare state structures (Esping-Andersen 1990), however, the United States stands out in terms of 
both levels of serious violent crime, as measured by homicide rates or aggravated assaults (Gallo et 
al 2014), and punitiveness, as measured by imprisonment rates (Lacey and Soskice forthcoming). For 
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example, in the 1950s, the imprisonment rate in the US was double that in England and Wales; 
today, despite the fact that the English/Welsh rate has itself doubled in the intervening decades, the 
US rate is five times higher, with American prison rates at levels unprecedented among developed 
countries (Figure 1). The homicide rate stands at between 4 and 5 times that of England and Wales – 
not entirely out of line with its ratio in 1950 (6:1), but much lower than when homicide rates 
reached their peak in the 1970s, when the US rate reached ten times that of England and Wales 
(UNODC 2012).  
 
There is a substantial literature which ponders the striking history of criminal justice in America 
during this period (Garland 2001; Lynch 2010; Pfaff 2012; Simon 2007; Tonry 2004; Wacquant 2009; 
Western 2006; Whitman 2003; Zimring, Hawkins and Kamin 2001; Zimring 2007, 2012).  Three things 
about this literature are worthy of comment. First, the literature which is concerned with patterns of 
punishment –particularly with the growth of mass imprisonment – is relatively separate from the 
literature on patterns of crime, with the maintenance of high imprisonment rates notwithstanding 
steadily falling crime since the early 1990s encouraging the view that the two phenomena run on 
different tracks.  Moreover much of the literature on crime is reluctant to venture general 
hypotheses, concentrating rather on using data to undermine mono-causal explanations (notably 
the impact of policing, imprisonment or unemployment).  Secondly – and with one partial but 
important exception, that of race, - to the extent that these literatures speak to one another, they 
do so primarily in terms of an investigation of how criminal justice variables such as the ‘War on 
Drugs’, sentencing frameworks, levels of imprisonment or policing affect crime rates and vice versa, 
rather than in terms of how broader economic, social or political dynamics shape each of these 
areas. Thirdly, although much of this literature is ostensibly concerned with politics, and goes 
forward in terms of discussions of ‘the politics of race and crime’, ‘the politics of law and order’ 
or‘punishment and democracy’, these references to politics in the criminological and sociological 
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literature mainly emphasise the salience of crime and punishment as political issues. They rarely 
scrutinise the relevant preferences and interests, and the political institutions through which 
criminal justice preferences and policies are constructed and filtered over time. Unfortunately, with 
a few honourable exceptions, political scientists have returned the compliment by ignoring crime, 
punishment and criminal justice institutions as genuinely political phenomena worthy of systematic 
analysis.i 
 
  
In this paper, we seek to explain why both crime and punishment rose so sharply in the USA in the 
1970s and 1980s, and why crime and the rate of change of punishment fell from the early 1990s 
onwards.  These patterns of crime and punishment in the USA greatly magnify corresponding 
developments in other Liberal Market Economies - Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK - 
faced with similar broad macro-technological transformations, namely the collapse of Fordism in the 
1970s and 1980s and the development of knowledge economies in the 1990s and 2000s.  We set out 
the case for seeing these differences as largely the product of dynamics shaped by the institutional 
structure of the American political system.  On the face of it, this may seem a surprising claim, given 
that all these countries are competitive political systems in Lijphart’s sense (Lijphart 1984, 1999), by 
contrast to the negotiated political systems of Northern Europe. Nor – in comparing the American 
political system with these others – do we suggest that it is the Presidency or the operation of 
Congress which is the relevant factor. We will argue, rather, that the distinctive American trajectory 
is shaped directly and indirectly by local democracy in the USA in the key policy areas of residential 
zoning, public education, and criminal justice (embracing policing, prosecution and sentencing).  The 
American level of local autonomy has no parallel in the other Anglo-Saxon polities, where regulatory 
frameworks as well as senior appointments of officials are made at national or provincial level. Local 
democracy, especially in the large Northern and Mid-Western cities,  we hypothesise,  may help to 
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explain America’s distinctive patterns of crime and punishment in the late 20th Century,   because it 
magnified through residential and educational segregation and concentrated poverty the social 
problems caused by deindustrialisation and the collapse of Fordism (Peach 1996; Johnston et al 
2007; Peterson and Krivo 2010).  Why then did violent crime drop and the rate of change of 
imprisonment fall from the early to mid 1990s on? We hypothesise and present evidence that the 
move back into city centres of young professionals associated with the ‘knowledge economy’ both 
dramatically improved local labor markets for low skilled males and  operated via local democracy to 
change policing tactics in some inner city areas. This thesis is backed up by the evidence that city 
populations continued falling in large cities in which crime continued rising (notably Detroit, 
Philadephia, Milwaukee and for a time Baltimore: see Figure 6).  More generally, we argue that the 
debate about the relationship between crime and punishment has been distorted by its focus on 
imprisonment rates: while imprisonment rates do not track crime, rates of change in imprisonment 
track violent crime, in a lagged way, remarkably closely (see Figure 4). 
 
How can local democracy generate such outcomes? The hypothesis which we put forward in this 
paper is that decisive voters in generally low turnout local elections (municipalities, counties, school 
boards, district attorneys and judges) are home-owners for whom a main concern is the value of  
their primary assets: their homes; and residential and implicit educational segregation, as well as 
tough policing, prosecution and incarceration, all played a part in the distancing of their homes from 
poverty and disorder  during the 1970s and 1980s.  While decisive voters remain home owners, we 
discuss the (limited but important) extent to which some of these policies – notably on policing – 
changed when inner city populations grew again from the early 1990s. 
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In direct opposition to the view that the cause of the ills of American criminal justice in the late 
twentieth century derives from an excess of ‘federalisation’ (Stuntz 2011, Scheingold 2010), we 
suggest that the radically decentralised character of American democracy may have been a key, if 
indirect, cause of both relatively high rates of crime (particularly serious violent crime:  Miller, 
forthcoming) and punitiveness under the economic and social conditions prevailing from the 1970s 
until the 1990s following the collapse of Fordism. We further suggest that the crime decline and the 
gradual stabilisation of  imprisonment rates since the 1990s has been shaped by local political 
dynamics, particularly in large cities, attendant on the emergence of  a knowledge economy. 
 
While both decentralisation and the impact of political institutions at the local level have begun to 
feature in a small literature on various aspects of criminal justice (Barker 2009; Garland 2010, 2013; 
Campbell 2012), there has as yet been no attempt to provide an integrated analysis of just how 
those institutions affect the interests and motivations of relevant groups of actors such as voters, 
criminal justice officials and political elites across a range of interlinked policy areas. The ambition of 
our paper is to set out a clear hypothesis about the role of the decentralised American political 
system in driving both punishment and, more controversially, crime from the 1970s to the 1990; to 
show how that thesis is consistent with the crime decline and deceleration of punishment over the 
last 20 years; to review the evidence which gives credence to our thesis, and supports the view that 
crime levels have been a more important determinant of incarceration rates than has been generally 
supposed; and to make the case for a research agenda exploring what has been a largely neglected 
area in the study of American criminal justice. 
 
  
 
6 
 
The politics of crime and punishment in America  
Democracy In America: non-partisan electoral competition in multiple arenas 
Voter affiliations – and hence the strategies which candidates use in seeking election – are defined in 
the USA in terms of the policies and even personalities of current office-seekers or office-holders to 
a much greater extent than the more disciplined political systems of the other Anglo-Saxon 
countries: in the American system, characterized by weak party discipline, it pays leaders, as 
individual candidates for office, to appeal directly to voters.   In this context, policies likely to secure 
independent votes by appealing to median voter interests have become a key preoccupation for 
political leaders. To the extent that criminal justice is identified by politicians as just such an issue 
(here crime and the fear of crime potentially enter the political picture, Enns 2014), this sets up, 
loosely speaking, a ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ (Lacey 2008) in which candidates become locked into a 
strategy which they dare not abandon because of the electoral advantage, particularly vis-à-vis 
‘floating voters’, which they fear would accrue to the other side. Key examples at the national level 
would be Richard Nixon’s War on Drugs (later amplified by Ronald Reagan) and Bill Clinton’s 
enthusiastic support for the death penalty. The key impact of the electoral ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ 
dynamic in the US seems likely, however, to be at the state and local levels.  
 
The impact of political institutions on criminal justice varies significantly as between different levels 
of electoral competition (Miller 2008). But these levels are much more numerous and differentiated 
in the US than in almost any other advanced democracy (Soskice 2009). The radically extensive and 
extraordinarily decentralized quality of American democracy sets up, we suggest, two dynamics 
which, particularly in a world of relatively widespread anxiety about crime, strongly shape the 
formation of crime policy. First, it implies that the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ is reproduced through very 
frequent elections at state, county and municipal levels, significantly increasing its impact. Second, it 
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implies an accountability gap: individuals seeking election at local level have an interest in 
advocating popular policies the costs of which do not necessarily fall on the electoral constituency 
(Soskice 2009; Boggess and Bound 1993; Stuntz 2001; Campbell 2012:306; Zimring 2012 Appendix 
B). Increased resort to imprisonment, where the political benefit accrues largely to local politicians 
while the costs fall on the state, would be a key example. This accountability gap is a common 
consequence of the negative externalities of local decision-making, another example being 
expenditure on the education of those who subsequently move elsewhere. 
 
In relation to the key policy areas relevant to poverty, segregation and crime and punishment, it 
would be hard to exaggerate the distinctiveness of the American tendency to organize governmental 
and executive power through electoral mechanisms at the local level (see Figure 3). Though state 
politics and the varying institutional structure of states are undoubtedly of great importance in 
understanding crime policy (Barker 2009), there is strong reason to think that the local level of the 
county or city, where in any case many state policies have to be implemented and interpreted –  a 
level which is more laborious to research, and hence less fully understood - has been of equal or 
even greater significance. And if weak party discipline and personal platform- domination has largely 
characterized national and state level politics, this is yet more true of local politics. Here actors with 
key roles in the criminal process - mayors, judges, district attorneys, sheriffs, to name only the most 
obvious – are, in stark contrast to other liberal market economies, often elected, and hence subject 
to direct electoral discipline; and their electoral campaigns depend on an extensive practice of radio 
and television advertising focused on individual record or policy commitments rather than on party 
platforms. Beyond this, the American practice of electing officials – County Commissioners, School 
Boards, Treasurers and so on - reaches deep into institutions at one or more remove from the 
criminal justice system, in which a median voter orientation will be likely, under certain conditions, 
to bring concerns about crime and punishment into play.  These locally elected officials in turn 
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appoint police chiefs and zoning boards. The resulting electoral cycle effects on policy areas such as 
police hiring, rates of prosecution, rates of dropping charges and conviction rates (particularly in 
property and drug cases: Dyke 2007) and even judicial decision-making on sentencing and case 
disposal are amply attested in a developing  political science literature (Brooks and Raphael 2002; 
Gordon and Huber 2004; Berdejó and Yuchtman 2013; Levitt 1997; Shepherd 2009)ii  as well as in 
ethnographic research (Bogira 2005: 311-36). 
 
The collapse of Fordism and the rise in violent crime and punishment from the late 1960s to early 
1990s:  the polarizing and reinforcing dynamics of local electoral democracy  in education, zoning 
and crime policy 
 
In this section, we develop a testable thesis about  how the dynamics of decentralized politics 
reacted to the social and economic upheavals of the collapse of Fordism and led to two decades of 
sharply rising violent crime and incarceration.   
 
The ultimate locus of most democratic decision-making in residential zoning, public schools and law 
and order (policing, public prosecution and non-appellate state justice)  in the US is the city or 
county; this entails that local autonomy has tremendous power, and that decisions reflect the 
interests and preferences of median voters. The decisive voter in local elections is likely to be a 
home owner with strong concerns (Fischel 2001, 2004) to segregate the poor residentially – in the 
suburbs to keep the poor out , and in the cities to push the poor into their own enclaves (Beckett 
and Herbert 2009); to keep property taxes low if public schools are bad (de facto segregated) or high 
if they are good, in order to maintain property values; and in any case to promote de facto 
educational segregation.   The exclusionary implications of homeowners’ concern with property 
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values is amply attested in the minutes of homeowner and neighbourhood associations in relation to 
zoning boards. These local political dynamics  in zoning and public education  explain the background 
conditions of densely segregated housing and de facto segregated and less resourced education for 
poor ethnic groups;  as employment fell for less-skilled male workers in Fordist plants, so 
unemployment and poverty grew in these neighbourhoods – reinforcing the local politics of 
residential and educational segregation. 
 
Another ‘local’ policy area is policing, with cities having independent police forces and in 
consequence senior appointments and decisions about police practices being made at local level. 
Refracted through mayoral and council elections broad police practices are responsive to local 
democracy. To take the most  salient policy example, given residential segregation, homeowner 
voters will have reason to favour effective policing outside disadvantaged, high-crime areas and 
limited resources for policing in these areas (where victims are poor and are not median voters). 
Moreover in so far as these areas have high levels of violent crime and established gangs, they are 
extremely costly to police effectively. One can readily see how this may become a self-reinforcing 
process: with  ineffective policing, violence is liable to increase, further eroding trust in the police 
and increasing the costs of ‘community’ policing.  In this context, there is a greater temptation to 
turn to minimal, or aggressive, quasi-military policing tactics (Goffman 2014; Meares and Kahan 
1999).  
 
These policies on zoning, education and policing have strong implications for violent crime, both in 
highly segregated poor (largely black and hispanic) tracts and via its spill-over into middle class 
areas. In a powerful recent study, Krivo and Petersen have shown how violent crime is strongly 
related to highly segregated disadvantaged  areas, with large ethnic populations and with a high 
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proportion of high school dropouts, in large ex-manufacturing cities (Peterson and Krivo 2010; Krivo, 
Peterson and Kuhl 2009).  In an important finding, Krivo and Peterson also show that middle class 
areas in cities with high proportions of such poor high violence areas suffer from spillover of violent 
crime. Indeed, the violent crime rate in the most advantaged white neighbourhoods in cities with 
high segregation is equal to the rate in the least advantaged white neighbourhoods in low 
segregation cities  (Petersen and Krivo 2010).iii  
 
 
Why did violent crime rise so dramatically from the late 1960s to the early 1990s in these 
disadvantaged areas? Violent crime was relatively low in the early and mid 1960s, then began rising. 
It levelled off briefly from 1980 to 1983 and then resumed a rapid rise in the late 1980s till the early 
1990s since when it has fallen (Figure 4).  Our argument is that the major trends over time are 
shaped by the availability of reasonable employment for males from disadvantaged backgrounds in 
segregated neighbourhoods.  In the early to mid-1960s, the Fordist regime provided, directly and 
indirectly, employment even for those with weak educational background and low social capital.  
This was  because  semi-skilled employment on assembly lines required physical skills but limited 
analytical or social skills, and unionisation was relatively easy to impose on Fordist employers, 
because of the assembly line system.  Moreover the semi-skilled had considerable power within 
unions because they were necessary to assembly line continuity. So even the disadvantaged shared 
in high negotiated wages. Fordism gradually collapsed as a competitive system from the late 1960s 
through to the early 1990s. The implications of this can be seen from data in Figure 5 on real hourly 
earnings of male workers in 10th and 20th percentiles of the labour force.   
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What explains the collapse in  10th /20th percentile earnings illustrated in Figure 5? The 1970s and 
1980s saw a  continual middle-class exodus from inner cities, which in itself reduced availability of 
low-skill service employment in the inner city.  As Fordist jobs were largely eliminated by 
automation, new jobs increasingly followed middle classes away from city centres - and increasingly 
demanded analytic and social skills.  And as middle classes moved away, so socio-employment 
networks – which could link those in the inner city with employment opportunities – declined.  This 
in turn led to the collapse in inner city unskilled earnings.  Many of the  resulting group of unskilled, 
unemployed men were black Americans who had moved relatively recently, in the middle decades 
of the 20th Century, from the Jim Crow South to the North in search of work and better opportunities 
– before becoming surplus to the requirements of the labour market in the 1970s (Wilson 1987, 
1996). The Civil Rights Act was less than a decade old when the economic collapse overtook the 
industrial cities; persisting discrimination and segregation in both housing and education meant that 
the educational and social disadvantages which African Americans had brought north with them 
remained ineffectively tackled.  
 
Why did this cause the huge increase in violent crime?  We suggest that there were two types of 
causes: lack of (or inappropriate) public policy responses; and individual responses by disadvantaged 
males. Taking policy causes first, our suggestion is that these developments made homevoters more 
determined to maintain residential segregation; and local democracy allowed these interests to 
produce zoning ordinances and their enforcement through zoning boards, with accentuated 
segregation contributing to the increase in violence and the social disorganisation which produces it. 
Secondly, public education opportunities for disadvantaged youth were determined through school 
boards; here again, as disadvantaged youth turned to violence and the alternative economies 
offered, for example, by gangs, homevoters became more concerned to reinforce  de facto 
educational segregation, especially for high schools. Thirdly, home voter interests were also decisive 
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in blocking the investment in serious foot patrols or ‘community’ policing in poor areas, which 
accordingly experienced either a vacuum of legitimate law enforcement or aggressive, military-style 
policing, often on an intermittent basis (Meares and Kahan 1999).  In terms of individual responses, 
disadvantaged youths accordingly found themselves in dangerous weakly policed environments, and 
street gangs (which had been unimportant before mid-1970s) developed as protection devices, using 
violence to protect their turf. This increased with their engagement in the drug market, encouraged 
by the ‘War on Drugs’, and was further increased by gang instability as leaders were incarcerated 
and new leaders needed to establish a reputation for toughness.  Gangs further became involved in 
legitimate as well as illegitimate social control, and teamed up with institutions like block clubs, 
community associations and churches to provide local goods and security – hence with public local 
support and toleration of their illegitimate activities, albeit within limits (Pattillo-McCoy 1999: 
chapters 4 and 5).  While there is a significant amount of ethnographic work to support this 
argument  (Venkatesh 2008, Patillo 2007; Hagedorn 1998, 2008), comparable aggregate data on 
gangs is poor.  However, such data as exists confirms that  this was period of major upswing of gangs 
(US Youth Gang Survey 2011); and recent research has confirmed that this was also a major period 
of growth of prison gangs which were important in areas with big cities (Skarbek 2014).  
 
The juxtaposition of the extremes of wealth and poverty produced by America’s distinctive form of 
capitalism, along with the normative force of the ‘American Dream’ combined with the impossibility, 
for many, of realising it, have been argued to produce a criminogenic anomie (Messner and 
Rosenfeld 2007; Lafree 1998).  The dominant explanation of the relationship between segregation, 
poverty and crime lies in ‘disorganisation theory’ (Hagan and Peterson 1995; Sampson and Wilson 
1995; Sampson and Groves 1989) – the argument that deprivation and in particular concentrations 
of deprivation undermine the capacity of communities to sustain norms of order.  Crucially for our 
thesis, much of that disorganisation in the US is traceable to political decisions at the local level 
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(Hagan and Peterson 1995: 15 23-4; Massey and Denton 1993: 14, 153-60). As Krivo and colleagues 
spell out the irony here, the greater the fragmentation and polarisation, the greater the need for 
coalition-building to resolve problems, yet the lower the capacity to engage in it (Krivo, Peterson and 
Kuhl 2009).  In the face of these developments, it is hardly surprising if the middle class median voter 
reacted by interpreting crime and indeed poverty as matters of individual responsibility, thus 
legitimating their own resistance to voting for expensive strategies such as the improved housing, 
better schools and proactive policing  (Alexander 2012: 216).  
 
Thus we believe the remarkable upsurge in violent crime through the 1970s and 1980s stemmed 
from three factors:  ineffectively policed, poor (largely ethnic) residentially and educationally 
segregated neighbourhoods – the consequence of local democratic decisions reflecting the interests 
of middle-class homeowners;  the collapse of Fordist employment and the devaluation of less-skilled 
labour which led to mass unemployment of young ethnic males in these segregated neighbourhoods 
and sharply reduced returns to legal low-skilled work; and, as social disorder developed, the rapid 
growth of gangs, initially as self-protection institutions, where violence was a consequence of turf 
war and drug-dealing. These factors as we see it were self-reinforcing as the economy of the inner 
cities weakened.   
 
A key element of our underlying argument is that violent crime drives punitiveness which in turn 
drives the rate of change of incarceration. We have shown (Figure 4) that (at least in terms of 
correlations) this is true at the national level. Moreover Miller (forthcoming) has shown the 
relevance of violent crime for the political salience of crime and punishment. Unfortunately we do 
not have data for the punitiveness variable at the state or local level, and data for incarceration only 
at the state level.  So while there is considerable ethnographic  and electoral cycle research evidence 
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(already cited) that prosecutors and district judges are responsive to electoral concerns about 
spillover violence, this is an area which needs to be further researched before it can be pinned 
down. What is known however is that high violent crime in poor neighbourhoods in a city produces a 
spillover in violent crime to middle class neighbourhoods; and that this spillover effect is magnified 
by increasing levels of violent crime (Petersen and Krivo 2010).  Given the relation between spillover 
violent crime and the political salience of punishment to which Miller (forthcoming) has pointed, this 
seems to offer a potential explanation for the rapid increase in incarceration during the decades of 
rising violence. Moreover when violence stopped increasing and began to fall, so too did the 
increase in incarceration (Figure 4). Bearing in mind that the change in incarceration is (loosely) the 
variable on which policy makers can act – by prosecuting and imprisoning offenders and then by 
hastening or not their release – this seems a relevant result. Again it is shaped by local democracy.   
 
We might summarise our thesis by saying that when the poor have a strong presence (Wilson 1987), 
these reinforcing policies lead to a ‘bad’ equilibrium; conversely, when the poor are hardly present 
‘nice’ communities result from the same dynamics.  Our hypothesis would explain how  the ‘bad’ 
equilibrium created fertile conditions for persisting (racially patterned) ghettos, poor schools and 
sporadic and/or militarised policing which further attenuated the social structures which would have 
been capable of promoting social norms and order (Patillo 2007). The thesis suggests that residential 
exclusion further leads to attenuated networks which create further barriers to integration and 
social mobility (Royster 2003; cf. Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Charles 2006), and effects damaging black 
exclusion from pluralist politics (Massey and Denton: 153-60). The perverse incentives here are 
proportionate to the level of disadvantage: the worse the disadvantage, the greater the incentive for 
middle class voters to opt for segregation. Evidence for the politically self-sustaining quality of this 
equilibrium, even independent of race,  can moreover be found in ethnographic research such as 
Pattillo’s rich study of the gentrification of a downtown Chicago area, Black on the Block, in which 
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middle class blacks who have invested in housing exhibit much the same concern as their 
suburbanite white counterparts about the impact of the lifestyles of their less advantaged 
neighbours for property values (Pattillo 2007: Chapters 2 and 6).  Furthermore  the electoral success 
of a significant number of black leaders depends on the concentration of black voters which is 
produced by residential segregation – a factor which may have diluted the incentive for black elites 
to fight segregation (Massey and Denton 1993: 213-5).  
   
 The crime decline and the deceleration of punishment since 1990 
Our argument so far suggests that the dynamics of voting and of electoral competition in the 
decentralised US system have implied powerful polarising forces, which have given added political 
weight to both criminogenic and punitive dynamics.  The poor schools, residential segregation and 
zoned policing policies produced by local autonomy have, we suggested, combined with the 
economic and social upheavals generated by the prolonged collapse of Fordist semi-skilled 
employment for males to produce social disorganisation.  And social disorganisation is associated 
with high levels of crime (Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson and Wilson 1995).  
But two obvious questions can be raised about this thesis: First, how can the marked decline in 
violent crime since the 1990s be explained? Second, while the marked decline in violence has indeed 
led to a corresponding decline in our measure of punitiveness  (Enns 2014: see Figure 4), how are we 
to explain the continuing rise in the rate of incarceration until very recently?  
 
So why did violent crime start to decline in the 1990s?  The gradual development of a knowledge 
economy combined with the prolonged period of growth and low inflation in the US and elsewhere 
from the early 1990s to the financial crisis (the ‘Great Moderation’) generated a major population 
shift back especially into the largest cities where growth in high skill industries has been 
16 
 
concentrated. Florida’s important work on the ‘Creative Classes’ (Florida 2002), as well as Glaeser 
and colleagues’ work on skill clusters (Chatterji, Glaeser et al. 2013), help to explain the 
gentrification of inner city areas during this period.  We hypothesise that this co-movement of 
economic growth and of young professionals into the inner city led to declining crime for three 
interrelated reasons.  First, as Figure 5 demonstrates, it decisively raised real hourly earnings of  
unskilled male workers (10th percentile) as a corollary of the need for unskilled work to complement 
the emerging skill clusters.  Second, with rising population in city centres,  actual residential 
segregation declined between 1990 and 2000 (Massey and Rothwell 2009).  This in turn transformed 
the political dynamics, in that the new residents wanted effective policing of these areas including 
city centres.  Recent research by Sharp (2013) has shown econometrically across a range of 
metropolitan areas that the key variables in determining the importance of ‘Order Maintenance’ 
policing are, first, the percentage of ‘creative classes’ or other measures of  post-industrial 
development and, second, police use of surveys of citizen concern on crime and disorder to guide 
police deployment. Our tentative argument is therefore that violent crime declines (in the cities 
where it does) for fundamentally political-economic reasons; and that these political, economic and 
demographic developments are already having significant effects on the dynamics of local 
democracy. 
   
If the new political-economic dynamics have had decisive implications for crime, however, the 
polarising dynamic of American local politics remains evident.  For those unable or unwilling to play 
by the rules of the newly refurbished cities, or whose presence promotes feelings of insecurity 
among residents or those spending money on property investment, retail or leisure activities, new 
kinds of zoning regulation have been created.  These regulations take the form of  local civil, criminal 
and planning laws to ‘banish’ the troublesome from middle class areas (Beckett and Herbert 2009). 
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We can loosely test this broad explanation, since not all very large cities benefited from falling 
violent crime from the 1990s. The effects upon crime are suggested by Figure 6: of the largest cities 
outside the South, New York, Boston, Los Angeles, Chicago and Washington DC  all saw falling violent 
crime from the early 1990s on, while their population grew;  Philadelphia,iv Detroit, Milwaukee and 
Baltimore did not have declining violent crime (at least until the 2000s), and  did have continuing 
population decline.  
 
It can be seen from Figure 4 that the decline in violent crime since the early 1990s has been 
associated with a fall in the Enns (2014) punitiveness index, which measures changing attitudes to  
the rate of change of incarceration over time, and compares this with both public attitudes to crime 
and rates of violent crime.  Incarceration has gone on rising, so does that mean that the link 
between punitiveness and policy responses via incarceration has been broken? There is good reason 
to think otherwise. For the continuing increase in the imprisonment rate is driven by many factors 
which are not readily within policy-makers’ control – notably the continuing impact of increased 
numbers of long term prisoners on the global number.  So the relevant policy response which we 
would expect to see if there is indeed a link between crime, punitiveness and imprisonment is rather 
an effort  to change the rate of incarceration, by operating either on new admissions to prison or on 
releases.  As can be seen in Figure 4, the rate of change in imprisonment, after rising sharply through 
the 1970s and 1980s, began to fall equally fast.   This suggests that the effect of crime on 
punitiveness and the effect of punitiveness on policy on imprisonment have remained very much in 
place, albeit that institutional path dependence and the accretion of commercial interests in the 
prison system may well have slowed the deceleration of imprisonment to some extent (Gottschalk 
2014: 25-74).  Furthermore, the rate of change remained positive until recently, with rising 
incarceration (although significantly lower for violent crime). This is an area for future research, but 
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some part of the explanation is likely to do with the more  intensive policing of urban centers (often 
oriented to  ‘banishment’ of the homeless or otherwise troublesome: Beckett and Herbert 2009).   
 
Centralised vs local democracy: American crime, punishment and democracy in comparative 
perspective 
We have already suggested that the power of homevoters  - people particularly motivated to vote 
out of concern with ensuring policies which protect the value of their primary asset - (Fischel 2001, 
2004, 2005), in the American system of local democracy may hold an important key to 
understanding the distinctive dynamics of crime and punishment.    And we know that ‘homevoters’  
turn out to vote in much higher numbers than others (Hajnal and Trounstein 2005), resulting in a 
more advantaged median voter at local level.  Particularly given low turnout and homevoter 
interests, median voters at local level are hence likely to be considerably to the right of median 
voters at federal or even state level (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005: 16-17; Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 
1999).  They are also more likely to be significantly concerned about the impact of crime on property 
values and the quality of local services such as education than general survey respondents.  It is 
therefore a significant problem that  most evaluations of the political impact of concern about crime 
are based on generalised survey evidence  (e.g. Beckett 1997). Our hypothesis is that the 
homevoters who have so much power in local elections are in a position to co-opt the local state, 
which in effect operates in their private interests.  
 
But why should this ‘homevoter’ effect be so powerful in the United States, leading to unique levels 
of residential segregation (Peach 1996; Johnston et al 2007; Reardon and Bischoff 2011)? Two 
considerations are important, and differentiate the United States from comparable countries such as 
the United Kingdom. The first has to do with the structure of the labour market and of pensions 
19 
 
provision. The motivation of the median voter is almost certainly strongly affected by concern about 
property values in other countries where home ownership is widespread, as is the case in most 
liberal market economies. But in the US the home represents not only the largest personal 
investment for many middle class families, but also their pension pot, as compared with more 
complete public and occupational pension provision in the less flexibilised liberal market economies. 
Growing rates of home ownership through the second half of the Twentieth Century have increased 
the relevant dynamics (Simon 2010).  
 
The second consideration follows from the fact that the main mechanism by which segregation is 
achieved is that of zoning – a key form of autonomous political power at the local level ever since 
the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of zoning ordinances in 1926.v By contrast to the localised 
basis for zoning, education and policing decisions in the US, all the key rules governing zoning, police 
organisation and practice, justice, public prosecution, and the education system are made primarily 
at the national or provincial level in other liberal market economies such as Canada, the UK and New 
Zealand (Figure 3). This may help to explain the striking differences between the US and other liberal 
market economies which have also struggled with issues of inner city decline and unemployment 
following the collapse of Fordist production in the 1970s. Despite the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ effects 
attendant on national governments’ competing for median voters, more centralised systems, our 
thesis would suggest, avoid the negative externalities of local decision-making characteristic of the 
US. This is because of an important difference in the typical interests of median voters – and hence 
of politicians – at national as opposed to local level, even leaving the demographic differences just 
discussed aside. The idea that people are more likely to vote for public goods at the national than at 
the state or local levels seems counter-intuitive given evidence that more homogeneous groups are 
more likely to vote for collective goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999). However, it makes sense if 
one assumes a mobile society in which people vote at the national level for goods from which they 
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will benefit wherever they live. Conversely, at the local level people will be inclined to vote only for 
things from which they can be guaranteed to benefit – hence voters are less likely to vote for long 
term investment, notably in education, where the benefits accruing may then move elsewhere. Local 
voters, in short, have an incentive to ‘capture’ the benefits of social policy by restricting their 
support to policies from which they are sure to benefit. Under conditions of relative homogeneity, 
this becomes a less pressing concern. But the extensiveness of local electoral government means 
that arrangements which are in the interests of politically powerful swing voters – themselves drawn 
from more advantaged groups - can more readily be inscribed in public policy.  
 
If it is true that the positive externalities – the expectations that they may benefit from widely 
diffused goods - mean that voters are more likely to vote for public goods at higher levels of 
government, especially the national level, it would follow that  localities make a poor basis for long 
term policy-making let alone redistribution. (Indeed many progressive reforms at state level through 
US history have been motivated by the recognition that local decision-making performs poorly in 
terms of redistribution: Zackin 2013: 103). And while there has been some progress in the US, 
especially at the state level, in mounting legal challenges to impose uniform standards in education – 
notably in decoupling school spending from local property tax revenues (a strategy which itself 
ultimately depended on state enforcement (Corcoran et al 2003)) – housing and zoning policies 
remain strongly shaped by local interests, with devastating effects for efforts at desegregation, in 
both class and race terms. Even in the area of education, litigation strategies have had mixed success 
(Douglas 2005; Frankenberg and Orfield (eds.) 2012), with network-based inequalities rooted in 
factors such as private/parental contributions to school infrastructure and variations in teacher 
standards persisting even in the face of some political successes at the state level in increasing 
overall per capita spending. The continuing battle to counter voting restrictions likely 
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disproportionately to exclude the disadvantaged is testimony to the power of the relevant interests 
here. 
 
The structure of local government and in particular of ‘city trenches’ in the US is well known to have 
accorded power to ‘in-groups’ (typically those with property, strongly associated with race, for 
obvious reasons). Early city politics ran on ethnic lines, and provided a strong basis for reproduction 
of group/sectoral identities and ethnic separation (Katznelson 1981: 104ff, 80ff). Newer local 
political structures such as school boards have in many ways reproduced the old group-based 
Tammany Hall structures.vi The scope of local autonomy is such that huge regional and intra-state 
differences of what would in more centralized countries be stabilized by public provision and 
national regulation can emerge. In the UK, for example, policing, education and planning all go 
forward within a national legislative framework, with modest provision for local control/variation. In 
Canada, these policies are largely framed at Province level, while even voter preferences for more 
localised city government have on occasion been overridden by provincial legislatures in the 
interests of better co-ordination of policy (Mitchell-Weaver et al 2000:865). In the ‘balkanised’ 
(Miller 2010; Orfield 2002) local government of the US, multiple jurisdictions do not have to consider 
effects on other jurisdictions.  Yet more importantly,  the fact that elections are decided by a 
relatively small group of ‘median’ voters means that the ‘truly disadvantaged’ are rarely heard at the 
ballot box even if they vote, and that this problem becomes more intractable the greater the degree 
of inequality and concentration of disadvantage. Again, this is confirmed by empirical research: 
Pattillo’s black ‘middlemen’ lost power (Pattillo 2007) due to demographic changes and the collapse 
of Fordism.  
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That the voices of the disadvantaged tend to be muted in electoral politics, and that that 
disadvantage itself was accentuated by the collapse of Fordism is, of course, true in all the 
industrialised democracies. What is special about the US, however, is the degree to which the 
structure of the political system has allowed these widespread facts to issue in distinctively 
polarising policy. Our thesis implies that local autonomy in the US means that wealthier groups can 
opt out of collective problems via the construction of gated communities or the purchase of private 
education or private security: they can even incorporate within a new city with its own zoning laws. 
But, yet more importantly, local autonomy means that the local state itself can be invoked for similar 
structural purposes. In other words, zoning decisions, public housing policy, policing and school 
funding can be organised in the interests of the middle classes who swing elections. Hence to the 
extent that their interests have become more different, and that they view their fate as more and 
more independent from that of the disadvantaged,  support for redistribution to the latter becomes 
ever harder to motivate.  Moreover this would not be changed by a greater emphasis on local 
democracy or a change in constituency boundaries. For even granting Miller’s (2008) finding that 
high victimisation/high crime groups such as poor inner city blacks have a more sophisticated view of 
crime policy than do more privileged groups, to implement the sorts of policies which that 
sophisticated view would endorse – better housing, education and employment – would require 
resources. And these resources in turn depend to a significant extent – particularly in the wake of 
the federal funding cuts and squeezed state budgets of recent years - on a local tax base which 
would be severely attenuated. There is an irony here: in this markedly anti-statist democracy, it 
seems that the local state has become a powerful medium for realising private interests. Our 
suggestion is that these decentralisation effects, though they vary according to specific state 
structures (Barker 2009), are sufficiently pervasive to constitute a key part of the explanation for 
American exceptionalism. 
One further aspect of decentralisation bears on our explanatory hypothesis about  America’s 
distinctive problems of criminal violence, punitiveness and polarising social policy: the coordination 
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problem implicit in reliance on legal enforcement, often at local level, to implement national or state 
policy. As the Great Society and New Deal Programmes of the mid 20th Century attest – an era, 
incidentally, which saw drops in the homicide rate (Hall and McLean 2009) – the US can develop 
significant national policies in areas such as education, housing and criminal justice. President 
Obama’s Affordable Care Act provides a more recent example.  But the federal government can push 
forward nationwide policy objectives only within certain constitutional constraints and under certain 
conditions: either where a party with a clear programme has control of Congress as well as the 
Presidency, or where there is cross-partisan consensus. Where there is neither this power nor this 
consensus at federal level, everything turns on states or localities. And even when federal initiatives 
are brokered, implementation largely rests on action at the state and local levels (Feeley and Sarat 
1980). In the absence of powerful agencies or plentiful funding to provide economic incentives, 
implementation furthermore has to be triggered either by legal enforcement or by local political will 
(Lacey and Soskice forthcoming). 
 
Law is often regarded as a particularly salient resource to counter the discriminatory effects of public 
power in the US. But local autonomy means that law can often be subverted to the interests of the 
relatively advantaged. For the democratic choice at local level of local judges and district attorneys 
blunts what has been seen as the primary resort of minorities whose rights have been abused by the 
political will of local majorities, namely the US Constitution and the Constitutions of the several 
states.   ‘Legal adversarialism’ (Kagan 2001) has undoubtedly put tools into the hands of litigants 
with the resourcefulness (and resources) to challenge outcomes such as educational segregation or 
housing discrimination. However, the democratic choice of justices at the local level makes effective 
implementation of standards against local majority will difficult, even leaving aside pathologies of 
legal adversarialism such as high costs, delays, patchy impact and ineffectiveness at the level of 
implementation (Frankenberg, Lee and Orfield 2003; Douglas 2005; Frankenberg and Orfield (eds.) 
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2012). And this in turn – notwithstanding, and indeed in some ways evidenced by, the limitations of 
the various programmes rolled out under the aegis of the New Deal and the Great Society in the 20th 
Century – relates to an underlying structural difficulty for the Presidency to establish micro-
governing, rule-implementing federal bureaucracies across the US (Feeley and Sarat 1980). The US 
system moreover features lower status bureaucracies, and a lower overall level of trust in expertise, 
than other comparable countries (Savelsberg 1994, 1999). Lessons from school segregation and civil 
rights history show that while litigation strategies can achieve real progress, they are both costly and 
divisive: they provide an adversarial framework for policy implementation, while individual case-
based legal remedies or even class actions are rarely effective to resolve structural or coordination 
problems (Kagan 2001; Douglas 2005; Aaronson 2015). Hence this distinctively American translation 
of political activism into legal strategy has significant disadvantages.  It is no surprise that law has 
come to assume such dominance in the American system: it makes sense that the more 
individualistic and fragmented the society, the more likely it will be to resort to legal enforcement 
which does not depend on compromise and negotiation, hence bypassing structural problems of 
coordination. But these problems, inevitably, reproduce themselves at the implementation level, 
with key recent examples including the lack of enforcement powers under the Fair Housing Act 
(Massey and Denton 1993: 14-15, 187, 223-30, 206 ff ) and the notoriously long-running Gautreaux 
litigation in Chicago (Pattillo 2007: 110-4; Peterson and Krivo 2010: Chapter 5). These difficulties 
have become more acute in an era of declining funding for agency enforcement (Pierson and 
Skocpol 2007). 
 
   
Conclusion  
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Our hypothesis about what explains the exceptional character of American crime and punishment 
turns, then, on the nature of the US political system. But we have not centred our analysis on the 
features of the American system which generally capture attention: its federal structure, its 
distinctive constitution, its powerful system of judicial review or its distinctive reliance on legal 
solutions to political problems. Rather, we have focused on institutional arrangements which have 
drawn little comment from criminologists and sociologists of crime and punishment:  the United 
States’  weak party discipline under conditions of declining voter partisanship and, above all, its 
peculiarly decentralised character, which obstructs the development of national criminal justice 
policy while allowing for varying local solutions which tend towards significant regional variation; 
and which disproportionately reflect the interests of the relatively advantaged, and of homeowners 
in particular.  In the context of the significant demographic shifts which affected many cities in the 
run-up to the collapse of Fordist production in the 1970s, the decentralised political system has 
arguably led to increasing polarisation of housing quality, education quality, policing styles and social 
provision in and around American cities. In parallel, economic forces and technological change have 
led to similar polarisation in working life, and gangs have provided alternative paths to peer approval 
and meaningful activity, particularly for many young black and Hispanic men (US Youth Gang Survey 
2011). Our suggestion is that, taken together, these political, economic and social dynamics created 
a powerful centrifugal force which, up to the 1990s, significantly increased crime, insecurity and 
punishment in the least advantaged sectors of the population, while also increasing their poverty 
and the extent of their geographical and social isolation. The inevitable upshot, to paraphrase 
Peterson and Krivo (2010), is an ever more divergent social, economic and spatial world, and the 
development of what we might call ‘alternative social and political economies’ – parallel worlds of 
work, social interaction and social control, most vividly in the example of gangs – competing, 
colliding and, on occasion, co-operating  with the legitimate economy and the conventional social 
order. 
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If our argument is persuasive, it follows that there is a significant empirical research challenge to be 
met in criminal justice scholarship: to further investigate electoral cycle effects;  patterns of local 
implementation of state and federal  provisions; and the impact of local decisions on zoning, policing 
and education. Our thesis also has significant policy implications, suggesting for example that it 
would be a mistake to conclude, as some scholars have (Stuntz 2011), that the solution to the 
problems of crime and punishment is a rejuvenation of local democracy, let alone to think that an 
increase in direct electoral accountability equates to a better quality of democratic governance.  An 
analysis of the distribution of voter preferences within the decentralised US system in fact suggests 
the very different conclusion that the diffusion and localisation of democracy has been a powerful 
institutional factor in shaping America’s distinctive patterns of crime, punishment, segregation and 
indeed social inequality. The ‘truly disadvantaged’ groups, mainly located in inner city areas or poor 
suburbs, whose victimisation at the hands of both crime and criminal justice underpins their more 
complex view of crime and punishment (Miller 2008), are rarely the median or decisive voters in the 
electoral contests which shape policy . The recent history of increasing racial and socio-economic 
polarization, in both economic and spatial terms, much of it driven by zoning regulations and median 
voter concern with property values, gives the lie to any thought that greater localisation spells more 
equal criminal justice. Radical local autonomy is, in short, one important source of the ills of 
American criminal justice, and not a recipe for its cure. 
 
This thesis would also, finally, help to explain the extraordinary scalar and qualitative difference 
between criminal justice and other social policy outcomes in post-1970 America as compared with 
other liberal market countries. Democratic local autonomy plays a much smaller role in the rest of 
the Anglo-Saxon world: indeed, the contrast between this radical decentralization and the national 
frameworks within which planning, education and criminal justice policy proceed in other liberal 
market economies can hardly be exaggerated. Framework rules and laws governing all the policy 
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areas discussed in this paper - public education, zoning, police, public prosecution and justice - are 
made at the level of central government (England and Wales, and New Zealand) or at 
provincial/state and partially federal levels (Australia and Canada).  It remains to be seen whether 
the British Conservative Party’s ‘Big Society’ agenda, or the Labour Party’s localism agenda, will 
make significant changes in the decentralized American direction. In the event that they do so, our 
argument would lead us to expect adverse effects on poverty, educational inequality, spatial 
segregation, crime, punishment and relative disadvantage in England and Wales.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Imprisonment Trends in Europe and the USA, 1950-2010 
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n  
Source: International Centre for Prison Studies (2010) World Prison Brief; John Pratt 
(2008)‘Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess’ 
Figure 2: Levels of Political Decision-making in Liberal Market Economies 
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Figure 3 : American Exceptionalism in Adverse Social Outcomes 
 
 United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Australia New 
Zealand  
Canada Sweden 
Residential 
Segregation: 
(Ethnic) 
10.8 
[11.4] 
Black 
1.7 
[9.9] 
S Asian 
0.1 
[2.7] 
Asian 
0.0 
[19.6] 
Maori 
1.4 
[11.2] 
Asian 
 
Prison per cap 701 141 115 155 129 73 
Homicide rate 5.0 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.0 
Literacy score 
5th percentile 
136.7 151.2 145.1 164.8 144.5 214 
Child poverty  23.1 12.1 10.9 11.7 13.3 7.3 
Source: Ron Johnston, Michael Poulsen and James Forrest (2005) ‘Ethnic Residential Segregation 
Across an Urban System: The Maori in New Zealand 1991-2001’; International Centre for Prison 
Studies (accessed 2010) World Prison Brief; OECD (accessed 2013) ‘Literacy in the Information 
Age’; Unicef (accessed 2013) ‘Measuring Child Poverty’; UNODC (accessed 2013) Homicide 
statistics.  
Notes:  
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(1) Residential segregation: % population in large cities living in tracts where (a) > 70% ethnic (non-
white), (b) one ethnic group dominant, (c) > 30% of group in city live in these tracts. The number in 
[] is % of main ethnic group in cities analysed. 2001-2 Johnston et al2007 
(2) Prison data 2002-3; 2004 Canada 
(3) International Adult Literacy Survey 2000 OECD    
(4) Unicef, 2012 
(5) Homicide rate 2009 
(6) Note that black % in US big city sample is < % in US population (because of South), while Maori 
% >; both around 15% of population 
 (7) Prison per capita in US, male and female, includes jail. 
 (8) % children 0-17 in households disposable income (corrected for family size/comp)< 50% 
median.  
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Figure 4:  Violent Crime Rate, Punitiveness Opinion Index and Change in Incarceration Rate, 1960-
2010 (Violent crime rates, UCR data; change in incarceration rate data and public opinion data, 
Enns (2014). 
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Figure 5:  Hourly real earnings male employees by deciles, 1973-2009 
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Figure 6: Change in Aggravated Assault Rate and in Population, 7 Largest non-Southern Cities, 
1990-2009 (Aggravated assault rates, UCR data; population change, census data and population 
estimates) 
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i
 An example would be Pierson and Skocpol (2007) in which the significant criminal justice initiatives of mid-
20
th
 Century activist government receive no attention whatsoever. 
ii
 Consistently with our argument about the effects of competition, Gordon and Huber’s (2007) study found no 
electoral cycle effects in non-competitive judicial retention elections in 17 Kansas counties, as compared with 
clear effects in the 14 counties where judges were selected on the basis of partisan elections.  To date, 
underlining the need for further research on the local determinants of crime policy, electoral cycle research 
has been more focused on federal (presidential) and state (gubernatorial, state supreme court) elections (see 
for example Hall 1992; Smith 2004; Yates and Fording 2005) than on local elections. 
iii We focus our analysis on non-southern cities, and acknowledge that the explanation may be different for the 
South.   
iv
 The implications for Philadelphia, not least in terms of the polarising effects of intensive policing, are 
represented in Goffman’s vivid ethnography (2014). 
v
 A decision which was made during a period of significant black migration from the South. 
vi
  Some key differences between migrants from overseas, and black American migrants from the South, 
themselves related to the American political system, help to explain the dramatically different levels to which 
those groups became integrated in the city trenches system. The political regime in the Jim Crow South 
deliberately obstructed both the formation of political networks and the development of education by and for 
blacks. Even given that, as with most migration, those migrating North were among the best educated and 
organised of their group, it is logical to suppose that the blacks who moved north in search of a better life and 
an escape from Jim Crow would have been, on average, considerably less educated and politically organised 
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than other migrant groups, implying that their full integration would have been more costly for the localities to 
which they moved. The fragmented American system has never managed to co-ordinate an effective strategy 
to tackle the continuing effects of Jim Crow – a fact which is reflected in the racial patterns of crime, 
imprisonment, educational disadvantage and residential segregation discussed in this paper.  
